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Abstract Ideomotor theories of human action control
assume that performing a movement leads to the automatic
integration of the underlying motor pattern with codes of its
perceptual consequences. We studied the microgenesis of
action-eVect integration by varying the mapping of action
eVects upon actions from trial to trial. Experiments 1 and 2
showed that perceiving a tone repetition systematically
aVects one’s tendency to carry out the response that pro-
duced that tone in the previous trial, suggesting that even
the unintentional production of a stimulus creates a tempo-
rary binding of that stimulus with the action that brought it
about. Experiments 3 and 4 extended this Wnding in sug-
gesting that the integration and/or retrieval of action eVects
is modulated by attentional factors: Ongoing performance
is more impacted by action eVects if they are salient or
match the current attentional set.
Introduction
People plan and perform voluntary actions in order to reach
particular, intended goals, that is, to modify particular
states of aVairs or create particular events. Obviously, they
can do so only if they have reliable knowledge at their dis-
posal regarding which kind of action is likely to create the
intended event. According to ideomotor theories of volun-
tary action (James, 1890; Lotze, 1852) and, to some degree,
Piaget’s (1946) sensorimotor approach to cognition, this
knowledge is acquired “on the Xy”: Carrying out move-
ments is assumed to be accompanied by a more or less
automatic process of self-perception that integrates, without
much ado, the motor patterns underlying the movement
with the codes of that movement’s perceptual conse-
quences. In other words, actions become automatically
associated with codes of their perceivable eVects. This
bilateral association provides the individual with a retrieval
cue that allows creating that eVect intentionally: One only
needs to “think of” or “anticipate” (i.e., internally activate
the codes of) particular action eVects in order to prime and
activate the action that has been experienced to produce
that eVect before.
Although this issue was neglected for quite some time,
numerous recent studies provide increasing evidence that
action eVects are indeed picked up in an automatic fash-
ion (for an overview, see Hommel & Elsner, 2009): Peo-
ple quickly acquire bilateral associations between
actions and novel eVects, such as keypress-contingent
tones of a particular pitch or lights of a particular loca-
tion, whether these eVects are relevant to, or useful for
the task at hand (HoVmann, Sebald, & Stöcker, 2001;
Hommel, 1993; Ziessler, 1998) or not (Beckers, De Hou-
wer, & Eelen, 2002; Elsner & Hommel, 2001; Hommel,
1996). As studies using PET and fMRI have shown, once
an action eVect has been acquired its mere perception
primes apparently associated motor structures (in the
caudal supplementary motor area; Elsner et al., 2002;
Melcher, Weidema, Eenshuistra, Hommel, & Gruber,
2008).
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action-eVect learning occurs spontaneously and without
any intention to learn, Ziessler, Nattkemper, and Frensch
(2004) have argued that eVective action-eVect acquisition
depends on the active anticipation of the eVects and is thus
under attentional control. In their study, participants carried
out pairs of manual responses signaled by visual letters
(S1 ! R1, S2 ! R2). The second stimulus was systemati-
cally related to the preceding response so to allow for
acquiring R1–S2 associations—which Ziessler et al. con-
sider comparable to action-eVect associations. As evidence
for R1–S2 learning was obtained under undistracted condi-
tions but not when participants were in addition to the
sequential task to count tones presented in the R1–S2 inter-
val, the authors conclude that R1–S2 acquisition cannot be
automatic. But this conclusion is neither obvious nor neces-
sary. First, ideomotor approaches claim that action-eVect
learning is automatic in the sense of not requiring an inten-
tion to learn, but they do not speak to the amount of cogni-
tive resources involved. For instance, it is not unreasonable
to assume that action-eVect bindings need to be consoli-
dated in order to aVect subsequent behavior. As memory
consolidation is known to be resource demanding and frag-
ile (Jolicœur & Dell’Acqua, 1998), it may well be that it
suVers from an overlapping task, such as tone counting.
Second, even though it does not involve overt motor output,
counting a tone may well be considered an intentional
action. This means that Ziessler et al.’s tone-counting con-
dition turned the original R1–S2 sequence into one where a
third action intervened between R1 and S2, rendering it a
R1–R2–S2 sequence. If so, people might well have acquired
R2–S2 associations, but that they failed to acquire R1–S2
associations is hardly surprising. Finally, the group that
eventually showed the largest R1–S2 learning eVects also
showed by far the best performance on all measures from
the very Wrst trials on. For instance, their average reaction
time for the Wrst 12 performances of R1 (the response that
preceded and could thus not be aVected by the tone) was
already about 100 ms faster than the average of any of the
other three groups. This strongly suggests major diVerences
in motivation, which may also account for more eYcient
learning. In sum, we doubt that the available evidence pro-
vides strong support for a selective integration mechanism.
On the contrary, numerous Wndings support the ideomotor
expectation that carrying out a movement is indeed accom-
panied by the automatic (i.e., unintentional) integration of
its perceptual consequences.
The present study focused on the microgenesis of this
integration process, that is, the emergence of individual
action-eVect associations. According to the Theory of
Event Coding (TEC) of Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben,
and Prinz (2001) stimulus and action events are integrated
in two phases. The Wrst, activation phase consists of acti-
vating codes of a particular stimulus and/or action feature,
be that internally driven, as in the case of action planning
(accomplished by “anticipating” the intended action’s
attributes), or externally driven, such as when a stimulus
event is perceived. The second, integration phase serves to
bind the activated features together, hence, to integrate
them into a sort of event Wle (Hommel, 1998). These event
bindings may be actively maintained, such as when an
action plan is held in preparation (Stoet & Hommel, 1999),
or decay over time. In any case, however, event bindings
seem to survive 1 s or longer (Hommel, 1998; Hommel &
Colzato, 2004).
Here we applied TEC integration logic to action-eVect
integration. TEC claims that if the activations of codes (be
they stimulus- or action-related) overlap in time, they get
integrated. Hence, if the codes of an action plan are still
activated to some degree when the eVects of that action are
coded, action and eVects should become part of the same
representational structure. Given that the codes of action
plans commonly show activation 250 ms or longer after the
corresponding action is carried out (Stoet & Hommel,
1999; Hommel, 1994), there are reasons to believe that the
overlap is suYcient at least for immediate eVects triggered
by the action’s onset. Indeed, studies of long-term action-
eVect acquisition have shown that actions and eVects are
spontaneously associated if the eVects follow the action
onset by up to 1 s but not longer (Elsner & Hommel,
2004)—at least if the action-eVect interval is not “bridged”
by intervening events (cf., Reed, 1999). Likewise, if partic-
ipants estimate the extent their actions have caused a partic-
ular event, the accuracy of their judgments decreases
considerably if actions and eVects are separated by more
than about 2 s (Shanks, Pearson & Dickinson, 1989). With
respect to the short-term binding of stimuli and responses,
it has been shown that stimuli are integrated with responses
if they appear in a temporal neighborhood of about half a
second but not if they are separated from the response by
about 2.5 s (Hommel, 2005).
If actions and eVects are spontaneously (i.e., non-inten-
tionally) integrated into action-eVect bindings and if these
bindings have a lifetime beyond the presentation of the
eVect, the way they are bound together should aVect sub-
sequent performance. Assume, for instance, a left-hand
keypress is heard to produce a low-pitched tone, in a task
where high and low tones can appear and left and right
keypresses are carried out. If the co-occurrence of left-
hand keypress and low-pitched tone creates a binding
between the codes LOW and LEFT, presenting a high or
low tone shortly thereafter (i.e., while the binding is still
intact) should systematically bias response selection.
Figure 1 shows how. Given the high and low tones are the
perceptual alternatives in the present context, the partici-
pant is likely to represent these two possibilities as123
Psychological Research (2009) 73:425–435 427sketched in Fig. 1a, where the codes for high and low
tones are connected by an inhibitory link (see Bogacz,
2007). The same logic applies to the two alternative
responses (the left and right keypress or L and R), which
are also shown in this Wgure. If we assume that tones and
responses vary independently and are thus uncorrelated,
there are no long-term associations between tones and
responses. However, according to our reasoning, a single
co-occurrence of low tone and left response should induce
a binding between their representations, as indicated in
Fig. 1b.
What would happen if the tone repeats? As shown in
Fig. 1c, activating the code of the low tone should prime
the still bound response, the left keypress that is. This
means that a stimulus repetition should induce a tendency
to repeat the response as well. Now consider what a tone
alternation would imply. As shown in Fig. 1d, presenting a
high tone would activate the corresponding code, which is
not bound to any response (if we ignore previous trials for
a moment). However, given the inhibitory link between
the two tone representations, activating the code of the
high tone should lead to the inhibition of the low-tone
code. Given that this code is still bound with the left
response code, inhibition will spread to that code as well.
This follows from the integrated competition hypothesis
suggested by Duncan and colleagues (Duncan, 1996; Dun-
can, Humphreys & Ward, 1997). They pointed out that the
distributed cortical representation of perceptual and action
codes calls for integration mechanisms that create coher-
ent object-action compounds. Members of such a com-
pound beneWt from competitive gains achieved by other
members of the same compound, so that, say, integrating
RED with ROUND when processing the image of a cherry
has the consequence that increasing the activation of the
RED code also supports the ROUND code in its competi-
tion with other shape-related codes. The Xipside of inte-
grated competition is that losses in the competition also
spread among members, so that outcompeting the RED
code when seeing a banana somewhat later will also
weaken the ROUND code associated with it. In other
words, integrated elements win together and lose together.
Applied to our example, this means that binding LOW and
LEFT weakens LEFT if LOW loses against HIGH. Given
that left and right responses are the only alternatives, this
again implies that perceiving a high tone would bias
response selection toward the right response, which would
beneWt from the indirect inhibition of the left response
code.
Available evidence from stimulus-response integration
studies provides support for both implications. For one,
repeating stimulus features have been shown to speed up
response repetitions as compared to response alternations
(Hommel, 1998; Hommel & Colzato, 2004), suggesting
that stimulus repetition indeed induces a response-repeti-
tion tendency. For another, alternations of stimulus features
have been observed to speed up response alternations,
sometimes even more than stimulus repetitions speed up
response repetitions (e.g., Hommel & Colzato, 2004).
Along the same lines, with multidimensional stimuli,
response repetitions are particularly (i.e., over-additively)
fast if signaled by a stimulus that repeats all the features of
the previous stimulus (Bertelson, 1963), whereas response
alternations are particularly slow under these circumstances
(Hommel, Memelink, Colzato, & Zmigrod, 2008). Hence,
stimulus alternations indeed seem to induce a response-
alternation tendency.
According to these considerations perceiving a tone that
does or does not match a just-experienced response-
produced tone should systematically bias the decision to
perform a left or right keypress. Importantly, this should be
the case independently of previous experiences, hence,
Fig. 1 Illustration of the creation and retrieval of action-eVect bind-
ings. a Being exposed to high- and low-pitched tones leads to the cog-
nitive representation of these tones (low and high note for low and high
tones, respectively), which given that the two tones are alternatives in
the present context are connected by a mutually inhibitory link. Like-
wise, carrying out left and right responses leads to the representation of
these (again mutually exclusive) alternatives (L and R for left and right
responses, respectively). b Carrying out a left response followed by a
low tone leads to the activation of the corresponding codes, which
again leads to their integration (indicated by the double arrow between
them). For the lifetime of the binding, the two codes to act as an unit.
c Subsequently perceiving another low tone reactivates the corre-
sponding code, which spreads activation to the left response code it is
still integrated with. That is, a stimulus repetition primes a response
repetition by biasing the competition between response codes toward
the left code. d Subsequently perceiving the stimulus alternative (a
high tone) activates the corresponding code, which will inhibit the code
of the stimulus alternative (the low tone) via the inhibitory link. Given
that the low tone is still integrated with the left response, this inhibition
will spread to the left response code. Consequently, the competition
between response codes is biased against the left code, so that stimulus
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follow a left or right response are equal. We tested this pre-
diction as sketched in Table 1. Participants carried out
free-choice responses by pressing a left or right key (for a
discussion and validation of this technique, see Elsner &
Hommel, 2001; Hommel, 2007). Each trial consisted of
two parts. In the Wrst, induction part participants made a
freely chosen response (R1) to a non-discriminative visual
trigger stimulus (S). This response produced one of two
auditory eVects (EA), a low- or a high-pitched tone. Impor-
tantly, the mapping of response keys to pitch varied ran-
domly from trial to trial, so to prevent any incremental
response-eVect learning across the experimental session.
One-second later, in the test part of each trial, participants
encountered one of the two eVect stimuli (EA), which now
served as go signal (in 75% of the trials) to perform
another freely chosen response (R2). The measure of inter-
est was the response choice in the test part (i.e., R2). In par-
ticular, we analyzed the tendency to repeat the previous
response (R2 = R1) as a function of the relationship
between the eVect tone EA and the go-signal tone EA.
According to our hypothesis, participants should be more
likely to repeat a response if the two tones match
(EA = EA) than if the tones do not match (EA  EA),
because the tone’s code should still be bound with the
response that just had produced it.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 was conducted as a Wrst test whether action-
related codes are spontaneously integrated with codes of
their eVects, as suggested by TEC. If so, we would expect
response-repetition rates (%RR) to be higher if the R2-go
signal (EA) matches the preceding action eVect (EA) in
pitch than if it does not.
Method
Participants
Twenty students served as paid participants. As was the
case for all participants of this study, they reported hav-
ing normal or corrected-to-normal vision and audition
and were not familiar with the purpose of the experi-
ment.
Apparatus and stimuli
Visual stimuli (a row of 13 white-on-black asterisks) were
presented on a computer monitor and auditory stimuli
(sinusoidal tones of 400 and 800 Hz) through external loud-
speakers to the monitor’s left and right. Responses were
made by pressing the left or right of two external micros-
witches with the corresponding index Wnger. The experi-
ment was controlled by a standard PC running under ERTS
(Beringer, 1994).
Procedure
Each trial consisted of an induction part, to induce a partic-
ular action-eVect binding, and a test part, to diagnose the
presence of such bindings. Table 1 shows the sequence of
events. After an intertrial interval of 3,000 ms, the asterisk
string (S) appeared for 300 ms, requesting a speeded left
or right keypress (R1). Participants were instructed to
choose the key randomly and to avoid any strategy apart
from using the keys about equally often. If a response was
made a randomly selected eVect tone (EA) was presented
for 100 ms, its onset being synchronized with the key-
press. Due to the random selection procedure, keypresses
and tone pitches were uncorrelated, that is, in a given trial
each keypress had the same probability to trigger either a
low or high tone. Participants were told that these tones
were completely irrelevant for the task and that there
would be no systematic relationship between keypress and
pitch.
In the second, test part of each trial one of the two
eVect tones was used as go signal (EA) to signal a second
free-choice reaction (R2) in 75% of the trials; in the
remaining 25% no tone appeared and no second response
Table 1 Conditions in Experiments 1 and 2
Each trial consisted of two parts. In the induction part, a row of aster-
isks (Stimulus) triggered a free-choice response (R1), which was fol-
lowed by a randomly chosen high or low pitched tone (auditory action
eVect EA). In congruent or incongruent go trials of the test part, a high
or low pitched tone (which was congruent or incongruent with the pre-
ceding action eVect) triggered another free-choice response (R2)—the
dependent measure (?) being the type of response (same as vs. diVerent
from R1)123
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used to work against some of the most obvious strategies
in free-choice tasks, such as choosing responses accord-
ing to a standard predetermined pattern. In go trials one
of the two tones sounded for 100, 1,000 ms after the pre-
vious eVect tone had been presented. In 50% of these go
trials the tone was the same as the previous eVect tone
(congruent trial); in the other 50% the signal tone was the
alternative tone (incongruent trial). Participants were
instructed to respond to the tone as quickly and as spon-
taneously as possible by pressing a randomly chosen
response key and to refrain from responding if no second
tone would occur. It was emphasized that only the pres-
ence of a tone mattered for the execution of R2 while its
pitch would be neither relevant nor informative. Partici-
pants were also urged to use both keys and not to apply
any strategy. The program waited up to 1,500 ms for a
response. Responses with reaction times exceeding
1,500 ms were counted as missing, those faster than
100 ms as anticipation, and responses in no-go trials as
false alarms. All these errors were fed back to the partici-
pants. Following ten randomly drawn practice trials three
blocks of 64 randomly ordered trials each were adminis-
tered. After the session participants were asked whether
they had obeyed to the instruction and had guessed the
purpose of the experiment.
Results and discussion
Our dependent measure of choice is very sensitive to
individual strategies, which may conceal or even prevent
the possible impact of go stimuli on response choices.
Particularly damaging would be strategies that determine
response choices long before the go stimulus is pre-
sented, so that the selection process we intended to bias
is already completed. Accordingly, we not only took
measures to work against some of the strategies by
speeding response selection and including no-go trials,
but we also excluded participants that were likely to
apply a particular “pre-selection” strategy. For this rea-
son, we only considered participants who produced less
than 20% false alarms and at least 90% correct trials
altogether, and who did not report having used a
response rule. All participants passed these criteria and
no-one reported having paid any attention to pitch or
having guessed the purpose of the experiment. In fact,
most of them believed that reaction time was the impor-
tant dependent variable. We also excluded participants if
their mean %RR was lower than 10% or higher than
90%, which we consider strong evidence of an alterna-
tion or repetition strategy, respectively. This applied to
two participants. After excluding trials with response
omission (0.3%) or anticipation (0.4%) individual %RRs
were calculated as a function of congruency (see Table 1
for the coding scheme).1
In the induction part of the trials the two keys were
pressed equally often and their frequencies (48.5 vs. 51.5%)
did not diVer from chance. This observation, which we also
made in the following experiments, conWrms that partici-
pants experienced all possible response-eVect couplings
about equally often. The mean %RR in the test part was
39.1%, but the repetition rate was modulated by EA ¡ EA
congruency: As shown in Table 2, congruent trials pro-
duced more response repetitions than incongruent trials,
t(17) = 4.86, p < 0.01. That is, as expected, stimulus repeti-
tions were associated with more response repetitions, sug-
gesting that the present response choice was aVected by the
relationship between the previous response and its auditory
eVect.
It is interesting to note that the response-repetition fre-
quencies for congruent and incongruent conditions were
not distributed evenly around 50% but shifted toward
response alternations (i.e., around 39.1%). There are at least
two possible accounts for this observation, which we will
also make in the following experiments. The Wrst account
considers that people are often biased toward response
alternations, as can be seen in faster reaction times with
response alternations that repetitions, presumably reXecting
a general misconception about statistical probability (Ber-
telson, 1961; Soetens, Boer, & Hueting, 1985)—also
known as gambler’s fallacy. Interestingly, response alterna-
tions were faster than repetitions (335 vs. 357 ms) in the
present experiment as well, t(17) = 3.01, p < 0.01. Hence,
even though our study does not provide a “pure” measure
of the alternation bias, the fact that it has been so often
observed in other studies may be taken to suggest that our
participants also showed such a bias. This again might sug-
gest that our congruent and incongruent conditions were
indeed symmetrically distributed around a mean that would
1 We did not consider reaction times (with one exception in another
context below) because, as demonstrated and discussed by Elsner and
Hommel (2001), it is impossible to predict and interpret their pattern in
the present free-choice task. For instance, fast responses in the congru-
ent condition may indicate that (a) the response was particularly spon-
taneous, and thus free from strategic considerations, suggesting that
conditions were particularly good for tones to aVect response selection;
or that (b) the response was preplanned already and thus under full stra-
tegic control, suggesting that conditions were particularly bad for tones
to aVect response selection. Slow responses in the congruent condition
may be interpreted to reXect (a) particularly strong contributions from
strategic considerations (a lot of thinking before responding), which
one would expect to minimize the impact of the tone; but they may just
as well reXect (b) a delay due to extended competition between strate-
gic top-down factors and tone-driven bottom up factors, which again
would point to a particularly strong contribution from the tone. Multi-
ple interpretations also exist for fast or slow responses in the incongru-
ent condition, all suggesting that reaction times are a misleading
measure in the present context.123
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to the lower half because of the gambler’s fallacy.
The second account holds that our participants were not
biased toward repetition or alternation in principle, and that
the outcome for the congruent condition represents some-
thing like a neutral baseline. Indeed, it will turn out that the
43.5% we observed in the congruent condition of Experi-
ment 1 is the lowest estimate of the present study, and that
the other experiments will produce estimates very close to
50%. If so, the main impact of stimulus repetitions and
alternations would consist in stimulus alternations biasing
people toward response alternations. In other words, the
eVect sketched in Fig. 1d would be much stronger than the
one in Fig. 1c. As mentioned earlier, this would Wt with
occasional observations that stimulus-response alternations
produce faster and more accurate responses than complete
stimulus-response repetitions, at least numerically (e.g.,
Colzato, Fagioli, Erasmus, & Hommel, 2005; Colzato, van
Wouwe, & Hommel, 2007; Hommel & Colzato, 2004).
Indeed, given that repetition-induced priming of previous
bindings and alternation-induced integrated competition are
diVerent types of processes, there is no reason to believe
that the reaction-time beneWts they produce should be of
exactly the same size.
As we neither have a pure measure of possible general
alternation biases nor a noise-free measure of binding reac-
tivation and integrated competition, it is premature to try
deciding between these two interpretations. Importantly,
however, they both rest on the same assumption, namely,
that perceiving a self-produced stimulus event creates a
temporary binding of the codes underlying the action and
the codes representing the perceived event. As a conse-
quence, perceiving the same event or its alternative system-
atically biases response selection. Taken altogether,
Experiment 1 provides Wrst evidence for our hypothesis that
a single pairing of an action and an eVect is suYcient to
integrate their cognitive representations, and that this inte-
gration has a systematic eVect on subsequent response
selection.
Experiment 2
Even though the outcome of Experiment 1 is consistent
with our expectation that action-eVect binding aVects sub-
sequent response-selection processes, there is an alternative
interpretation. Our participants had the task of producing
random responses and response sequences, which is known
to be very hard to do. One way to make this task easier and
to still meet the task requirement of getting close to a 50:50
distribution of response repetitions and alternations would
be to strategically repeat the response whenever the stimu-
lus repeats. Note that this strategy only works well if the
probability of stimulus repetition versus alternation in go
trials is also 50:50. If this ratio would be drastically
changed, such as if stimulus alternations would be much
more frequent than stimulus repetitions, such a matching
strategy would be bound to fail: either response alternations
would now also become much more frequent than response
repetitions or participants would notice that a matching
strategy makes little sense and simply no longer apply it.
This was the logic underlying Experiment 2, which repli-
Table 2 Mean response repeti-
tion frequencies (in %) and re-
sponse-repetition biases 
(congruent–incongruent) for 
Experiments 1–4 as a function of 
E ¡ E congruency (match be-
tween eVect of R1 and go signal 
for R2), action-eVect modality, 
and modality of the task-relevant 
go signal for R2
Auditory action eVect (pitch) Visual action eVect (color)
Congruent Incongruent Bias Congruent Incongruent Bias
Experiment 1
Auditory go signal
43.5 (12.1) 34.6 (12.1) 8.9**
Experiment 2
Auditory go signal
49.1 (12.3) 41.9 (15.0) 7.1**
Experiment 3
Auditory go signal
47.6 (22.1) 40.5 (19.9) 7.1**
Visual go signal
50.1 (21.6) 46.9 (18.4) 3.2**
Experiment 4
Auditory go signal
46.4 (14.3) 41.4 (13.6) 5.0** 42.9 (12.7) 44.9 (14.4) ¡2.0 NS
Visual go signal
47.1 (19.9) 41.9 (17.6) 5.2** 46.3 (19.1) 42.7 (18.3) 3.6**
Standard deviations of means 
are given in parentheses
NS non-signiWcant bias
** SigniWcant bias, p < 0.01123
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repetitions and alternations. According to a strategic inter-
pretation of the congruency eVect, this manipulation should
eliminate the eVect, whereas an interpretation in terms of
action-eVect binding predicts the same outcome as in
Experiment 1.
Method
Twenty-one students served as paid participants. The
method was exactly as in Experiment 1 with only one
exception: the go trials of the test phase did not consist of
50% congruent and 50% incongruent conditions but of 25%
congruent and 75% incongruent conditions; i.e., the trigger
tone matched the previous action eVect tone in only one
quarter of the trials.
Results and discussion
Applying the same criteria as in Experiment 1 led to the
exclusion of one participant. Again, trials with response
omissions (<0.9%) and anticipations (<0.3%) were
excluded. The overall response-repetition rate in the test
part was 43.7%, which is higher than in Experiment 1 and
statistically no longer diVerent from chance. Clearly, this
observation does not support the idea that participants
might have strategically matched the response repetition
rate to the stimulus repetition rate. The response repetition
rate was again modulated by EA ¡ EA congruency,
t(19) = 3.07, p < 0.01, due to that congruent trials produced
more response repetitions than incongruent trials did (see
Table 2). An ANOVA on the combined data from Experi-
ments 1 and 2 did not yield any hint to an interaction
between experiment and congruency eVect, p > 0.5, con-
Wrming that the congruency eVect was equivalent in the two
experiments. Taken together, these Wndings suggest that the
congruency eVect does not reXect a deliberate response
selection strategy but rather represents an automatic by-
product of action-eVect binding.
Experiment 3
Our next experiment was conducted to see how automatic
the impact of action-eVect bindings really is and whether,
or to what degree it is sensitive to attentional eVects, that
is, to the task relevance of the eVect’s perceptual charac-
teristics. In Experiments 1 and 2, tones were used as both
action eVects (EA) and R2-go signals (EA). Accordingly,
although neither the pitch nor the presence of the action
eVect was of any relevance, tones did play an important
role and could not be ignored entirely. It may have been
this, somewhat indirect type of task relevance that drew
suYcient attention to the eVects to integrate and bind
them with the responses and/or to retrieve the just-bound
response when the eVect stimulus was encountered again.2
If so, it should be possible to reduce or eliminate the
impact of action-eVect bindings on ongoing response
selection by deWning the R2-go signal in another than the
auditory modality, so that tones are no longer of any rele-
vance. This is what we did in Experiment 3. In an audi-
tory-go condition we replicated Experiment 1 by using
again an auditory E. But we also ran a visual-go condi-
tion, where the R2-go signal was a visual stimulus (EV).
Although no longer of any relevance for the task, the tone
was still presented as EA, thus accompanying the visual
go signal in go trials and as the only stimulus in the test
part of no-go trials. If task relevance aVected the creation
and/or retrieval of action-eVect bindings we would expect
the response-rate eVect—that is, higher response-repeti-
tion rates if the R2-go signal matches the preceding action
eVect—in the auditory-go condition but not (or less so) in
the visual-go condition.
Method
Another 26 female and 19 male students were randomly
assigned to two groups of 23 and 22 participants, respec-
tively. For the Wrst, auditory-go group the method was
exactly as in Experiment 1. For the second, visual-go group
several modiWcations were introduced. The relevant go sig-
nal in the test part of each trial was not a tone but a red
3x3 cm square (EV)3 appearing for 300 ms at screen cen-
ter. Just like the tone in the auditory-go group, the square
was presented in 75% of the trials to signal R2 (go trials)
and participants were to withhold R2 in the remaining no-go
trials. The pitch of the tone matched the previous action-
eVect tone in 50% of the go trials and the alternative tone in
the other 50%. It was pointed out to the participants that
both presence and pitch of the tone would be completely
irrelevant for the task.
2 Note that the design of our study (or of any other analysis of sequen-
tial eVects) does not allow disentangling possible eVects on the crea-
tion of action-eVect bindings (i.e., integration) and on their retrieval.
Obviously, bindings can only be retrieved if they have been created
earlier, so that changes in the impact of action-eVect bindings on per-
formance may be due to changes in the binding process, changes in the
retrieval process, or both. We will get back to this issue in “General
discussion”.
3 In keeping with the terminology introduced in Experiment 1 we refer
to the visual go signal as EV. However, note that in the induction part
of Experiment 3 there were only auditory action eVects (EA) but no vi-
sual action eVects (EV).123
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Applying the same criteria as in Experiment 1 led to the
exclusion of three members of the auditory and of two of
the visual group. Again, trials with response omissions
(<0.6%) and anticipations (<0.1%) were excluded. The
overall response-repetition rate in the test part was 46.3%,
which is almost the same as in Experiment 2 and statisti-
cally not diVerent from chance. Mean %RR were analyzed
as a function of EA ¡ EA congruency (i.e., whether the two
tones in each trial matched or not) and R2-go-signal modal-
ity (i.e., whether R2 was carried out in response to the sec-
ond tone or a color square; see Table 2). The only reliable
Wnding was a main eVect of tone congruency, F(1,38) =
8.69, p < 0.005, while the interaction with go-signal modal-
ity was far from signiWcance, F(1,38) < 1. That is, irrespec-
tive of the tone’s task relevance, R1 is repeated more often
if the tone in the test phase matches the action-eVect tone.
All in all, the outcome of Experiment 3 is somewhat
mixed. Statistically speaking, task relevance had no impact
on the congruency eVect, suggesting that the auditory
action eVects were integrated and retrieved in either go-sig-
nal condition. However, numerically the induced bias in the
visual condition was not even half as big as that obtained in
the auditory condition. Moreover, auditory stimuli and their
impact on perceptual processing have been demonstrated to
be more salient, hence, to rely much less on attention than
visual stimuli (Posner, Nissen, & Klein, 1976). One there-
fore may argue that Experiment 3 provides a rather conser-
vative test of the impact of attention.
Experiment 4
To provide a more sensitive test we ran Experiment 4,
where responses produced both auditory and visual eVects.
We also presented stimuli of both modalities in the test part
of the go trials and varied their relevance. In one block, R2-
go signals were auditory, just like in Experiments 1–3,
which rendered the visual stimuli in either part of the trial
irrelevant. The saliency hypothesis suggests that auditory
action eVects should be integrated under such conditions
while visual eVect may not. If so, repeating tone pitch
(EA = EA) should lead to higher response-repetition rates
than alternating pitch, whereas repeating color (EV = EV)
should yield the same rates as alternating color. In another
block, R2-go signals were visually deWned, which rendered
the auditory stimuli in either part of the trial irrelevant.
According to the saliency hypothesis and in view of Exper-
iment 3, we would expect that both auditory and visual
action eVects are integrated and retrieved, so that response-
repetition rates should depend on whether pitch or color is
repeated.
Method
Another 27 female and 23 male students served as paid vol-
unteers. The method was as in Experiment 3 (visual-go
group) with the following exceptions. With regard to the
induction part, performing R1 now caused the simultaneous
presentation of a low- or high-pitched tone (for 100 ms)
and a red or green square at screen center (for 200 ms);
hence, each R1 had both an auditory and a visual eVect.
In the test part of the trials, three independent variables
were manipulated: the modality of the R2-go signal (tone or
square), the congruency between the pitch of the action-
eVect tone from the induction part (EA) and the pitch of the
tone presented in the test part (EA), and the congruency
between the color of the action-eVect square from the
induction part (EV) and the color of the square presented in
the test part (EV). Like in the visual-go group of Experi-
ment 3, there were two stimuli in the test part of go trials, a
low- or high-pitched tone and a red or green square. How-
ever, in a given block only one of them was task-relevant
by virtue of signaling a go trial, whereas the other was
entirely irrelevant.
The experimental session consisted of two blocks, an
auditory-go block, where no-go trials were deWned by the
absence of a tone in the test part of the trial, and a visual-go
block, where no-go trials were deWned by the absence of a
square in the test part of the trial. Block order was balanced
across participants. Each block was composed of 10 ran-
domly drawn practice trials and 192 randomly ordered
experimental trials. The 192 experimental trials comprised
144 go and 48 no-go trials, so that the go probability was
again 75%. The 144 go trials were composed of 36 trials in
which both the tone and the color presented in the test part
matched the action eVects of the preceding induction part
(i.e., EA = EA and EV = EV), 36 trials in which only the
auditory stimuli matched (i.e., EA = EA and EV  EV), 36
trials in which only the visual stimuli matched (i.e.,
EA  EA and EV = EV), and 36 trials in which neither the
auditory nor the visual stimuli matched (i.e., EA  EA and
EV  EV). To ensure that participants registered the visual
action eVects even in the auditory-go block, the instruction
emphasized that they should always Wxate the center of the
computer screen.
Results and discussion
Applying the same criteria as in Experiment 1 led to the
exclusion of 10 participants. Trials with response omissions
(<0.2%) and anticipations (<0.1%) were excluded. Mean
%RR were calculated for each participant as a function of
auditory (EA ¡ EA) congruency, visual (EV ¡ EV) con-
gruency, and modality of the relevant go signal (see
Table 2). A corresponding 2 £ 2 £ 2 ANOVA produced123
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ency, F(1,39) = 17.98, p < 0.001, and an interaction of
visual congruency and go-signal modality, F(1,39) = 9.26,
p < 0.005. As Table 2 shows, congruent pitch yielded a
higher rate of response repetitions independently of go-sig-
nal modality whereas congruent color aVected the repeti-
tion rate only if go trials were deWned by the presence or
absence of visual stimuli. Indeed, separate t-tests revealed a
highly signiWcant eVect of color congruency in the visual-
go block, t(39) = 3.27, p < 0.005, but not in the auditory-go
block, t(39) = 1.39, p > 0.05. This pattern supports an
account in terms of stimulus saliency: Action eVects are
integrated and retrieved if they are either relevant to the
task or salient enough to attract attention in a bottom-up
fashion.
Another important Wnding of Experiment 4 is that it for
the Wrst time demonstrates the integration of multiple action
eVects. Although previous studies on action-eVect acquisi-
tion employed a variety of to-be-learned eVect stimuli they
were always restricted to one type of stimulus at a time.
Yet, both auditory and visual action eVects inXuenced per-
formance in the visual-go condition of Experiment 4, which
suggests that participants had integrated their actions with
both pitch and color.4
General discussion
Our study tested a TEC approach to the integration of
actions and their eVects. We hypothesized that the likely
temporal overlap of activation of action- and eVect-related
codes induces the temporary binding of those codes. This
binding may aVect subsequent behavior by biasing it
toward response repetition in case of a stimulus repetition,
biasing it toward response alternation in case of stimulus
alternation, or both. Consistent with this expectation,
Experiment 1 showed that varying the pitch of a go signal
systematically aVects the tendency to repeat or alternate the
response that was just experienced to produce a tone of that
pitch. Together with the outcome of Experiment 2, which
rules out a strategic interpretation of the response repetition
bias, this suggests that codes of that action are still bound
with codes of the tone it produced. As a consequence, re-
activating the tone-related code spread activation to the cor-
responding action-related code, thus priming the previous
action as indicated in Fig. 1c, while activating the alterna-
tive tone code led to the inhibition of the codes of both the
previous tone and the previous response, resulting in a pref-
erence for response alternation (Fig. 1d). Interestingly, the
distribution of response-repetition frequencies was shifted
toward response alternation in all experiments. This might
reXect a general impact of the gamblers fallacy and repre-
sent the same bias that has been shown in studies of sequen-
tial stimulus and response eVects (Bertelson, 1961; Soetens
et al., 1985). Alternatively, it might indicate that alterna-
tions of action-eVect stimuli bias subsequent response
selection more toward response alternations than eVect rep-
etitions bias selection toward response repetitions. In other
words, the priming of response repetitions as sketched in
Fig. 1c may be less eYcient than the inhibition of response
repetitions as sketched in Fig. 1d. The present study does
not allow disentangling these two possibilities, which calls
for a more detailed experimental analysis. However, both
possibilities imply that actions and eVects are spontane-
ously integrated into temporary bindings, which supports
our main hypothesis.
As the action eVect in Experiment 1 was not relevant or
informative, eVect integration seems to be spontaneous in
the sense that it does not require the explicit intention to
learn about those eVects. This supports Elsner and Hom-
mel’s (2001) assumption that eVect integration is an auto-
matic by-product of moving and acting. However, this does
not mean that goals and intentions, and the attentional set
they bring about, have no impact on eVect integration and/
or retrieval (Hommel et al., 2001). To the contrary, Experi-
ments 3 and 4 provide evidence that the likelihood with
which action-eVect bindings aVect performance depends on
both bottom-up and top-down attentional factors. If an
eVect is salient enough to attract attention in a bottom-up
fashion, as can be assumed for tones (Posner et al., 1976),
action eVects impact behavior even if they are neither
directly nor indirectly related to the task at hand. This Wts
well with observations from learning studies, where audi-
tory (e.g., HoVmann et al., 2001; Hommel, 1996) and elec-
trocutaneous (Beckers et al., 2002) action eVects were
spontaneously acquired and retrieved in otherwise purely
visual-manual tasks. Less salient eVects, however, such as
visual eVects in an otherwise auditory-manual task, seem to
depend more on the Wt of their attributes with the current
attentional set. Even though we manipulated saliency by
contrasting auditory and visual eVects, we consider saliency
to be a matter of degree and of the particular stimulus-con-
text relations rather than an absolute characteristic of a par-
ticular sense modality; but more systematic studies are
necessary to elucidate that issue.
Another question is which process exactly is aVected by
saliency. One possibility is that integration proper depends
on some minimal activation of eVect codes, which they may
reach only if they are either top-down primed because of
4 Alternatively, participants might have alternated between the integra-
tion of auditory and visual eVects. However, this should have de-
creased the response bias for both types of eVects, which does not Wt
the Wnding that the bias for auditory action eVects in the visual-go con-
dition was numerically stronger in Experiment 4 (where alternation
might have taken place) than in Experiment 3 (where action eVects
were all auditory).123
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2004). However, a major disadvantage of a selective inte-
gration mechanism would be that infants, children, and
adults facing a novel task would no longer be able to pick
up unpredicted but consistent action-eVect relations on the
Xy—a characteristic of action-eVect acquisition that one
may consider essential for the development of voluntary
action and action skills (Elsner & Hommel, 2001; James,
1890; Piaget, 1946). Another possibility is that action-eVect
binding is truly automatic and may not even be sensitive to
the availability of attentional resources, which would leave
binding retrieval as a possible target of our saliency manip-
ulations. Indeed, we cannot exclude that saliency aVected
the retrieval of just-created action-eVect bindings rather
than the creation of bindings. That is, stimuli may be more
eVective to trigger the retrieval of previously created bind-
ings if they are task-relevant or salient. Again, studies on
stimulus-response integration suggest that the retrieval of
bindings is more sensitive to attentional manipulations than
the creation of bindings is (Hommel et al., 2008), which
would Wt better with a retrieval-based interpretation of
saliency eVects. Nevertheless, the Wnal word on this matter
presupposes a better understanding of how action-eVect
binding and retrieval processes work, and how they are
controlled.
In view of the previous demonstrations of the acquisition
of stable action-eVect associations on the one side and of
the present evidence for transient bindings between actions
and eVects on the other, it would be tempting to assume that
the latter are functional predecessors of the former: The
transient coupling of action and eVect codes may reXect the
presence of reverberatory loops in the sense of Hebb
(1949), which again may serve to establish and consolidate
more enduring cell assemblies. In other words, binding may
represent the Wrst step to long-term memory (cf., RaVone &
Wolters, 2001, but see Colzato, RaVone, & Hommel,
2006). However, in the absence of clear-cut evidence that
action-eVect learning is impossible without binding (and in
view of the major methodological challenges demonstra-
tions of such evidence would need to overcome) this is no
more than an interesting speculation.
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